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1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COU SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW Y	ORK	
3	ALPARI (US), LLC,		
4	Plaintiff,		
5	V .	17 CV 5278 (LGS)	
6	BNP PARIBAS, S.A.,		
7	Defendant.		
8			
9		New York, N.Y. April 12, 2018 11:05 a.m.	
10	Before:	11:03 a.m.	
11	HON. LORNA G. SCHOFIELD,		
12	HON. LORNA G. SCHOFIELD,		
13		District Judge	
14	APPEARANCES		
15	SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP Attorneys for Plaintiff		
16	BY: WALTER W. NOSS (Via Telephone)		
17	ALLEN & OVARY, LLP Attorneys for Defenda	nt	
	BY: LAURA ROSE HALL (Via Telephone)		
18	CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL		
19	Attorneys for Credit Suisse BY: DAVID JANUSZEWSKI (Via Telephone)		
20	DAVIS POLK		
21	Attorneys for Royal Bank of Scotland		
22	BY: JOEL M. COHEN (Via Telephone)  JENNIFER ANN PREVETE (Via Telephone)		
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1 (Case called)

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THE DEPUTY CLERK: The judge is going to talk to the attorneys, and we can begin.

THE COURT: Good morning.

I called this conference so that I could give you a ruling on the pending motion by defendants to compel arbitration. I'm not going to hear any oral argument, but if any counsel would like your appearances noted on the record, please tell me now who is here.

Why don't we just start with the plaintiffs. The court reporter will take it down.

MR. NOSS: Good morning, your Honor. This is Walter
Noss from Scott & Scott on behalf of plaintiff Alpari.

THE COURT: Thank you.

How about from BNP Paribas?

MS. HALL: This is Laura Hall from Allen & Ovary, LLP for BNP Paribas.

THE COURT: Credit Suisse?

MR. JANUSZEWSKI: Good morning, your Honor. This is

David Januszewski from Cahill Gordon & Reindel.

THE COURT: Good morning.

And Royal Bank of Scotland?

MR. COHEN: Good morning, your Honor. It's Joel Cohen from Davis Polk with Jennifer Prevete, also from Davis Polk.

THE COURT: All right. Let's proceed. I'm not going

to give a lot of background. I know you're all familiar with it. These are three separate putative class actions in which the plaintiff Alpari brings claims that defendants reneged on orders that Alpari and other putative class members matched and accepted through electronic trading platforms in the foreign exchange market. As I mentioned, this is a motion to compel arbitration by the defendants.

One piece of background, the National Futures

Association or NFA is a self-regulatory organization with
authority from the Commodity Future Trading Commission to
regulate the derivatives market.

Entities that conduct business in derivatives are required to register as NFA members, and Plaintiff Alpari was a registered NFA member from November 14, 2007, to April 21, 2015.

Defendants BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse Securities (USA)

LLC, and RBS Securities Inc. are currently registered NFA

members. Defendants Credit Suisse AG, Credit Suisse Group AG,

and the Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, which I'll call, RBS

Group plc are corporate parents of the NFA member defendants.

The NFA Member Arbitration Rules provide for mandatory arbitration of "disputes between and among members" subject to the timeliness requirements and enumerated exceptions, and I'm quoting the NFA rule Section 2(a).

So turning to the legal standard, the Federal

Arbitration Act or FAA "embodies a national policy favoring arbitration." I'm citing *Nicosia v. Amazon.com*, *Inc.*, 834 F.3d 220, 228 (2d Cir. 2016).

However, "a court may order arbitration of a particular dispute only where the court is satisfied that the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute." Granite Rock Co v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 297 (2010).

The Court considers two factors when deciding if a dispute is arbitrable: "One, whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, and, if so, two, whether the scope of that agreement encompasses the claims at issue." Holick v. Cellular Sales of N.Y., LLC, 802 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2015).

"The question of whether the parties indeed agreed to arbitrate is determined by state contract principles, *Nicosia*, 834 F.3d at 229. "The arbitration rules of an industry self-regulatory organization are interpreted like contract terms; the organization's arbitration provision should thus be interpreted to give effect to the parties' intent as expressed by the plain language of the provision." *CitiGroup Glob*.

Markets Inc. v. Abbar, 761 F.3d 268, 274 (2d Cir. 2014).

"While doubts concerning the scope of an arbitration clause should be resolved in favor of arbitration, the presumption does not apply to disputes concerning whether an agreement to arbitrate has been made." Applied Energetics, Inc. v. NewOak Capital Markets, LLC, 645 F.3d 522, 526, (2d

1 | Cir. 2011).

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In deciding motion to compel arbitration, courts apply a "standard similar to that applied for a motion for summary judgment." Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 229. Courts must "consider all relevant, admissible evidence submitted by the parties and contained in pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits," and must "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Id.

So turning to this case, defendants' motion to compel arbitration is granted because Alpari's claims are subject to mandatory NFA arbitration. As relevant here, the NFA rules provide that "disputes between and among members shall be arbitrated under these rules," subject to timeliness requirements and exceptions not applicable here. I'm quoting the NFA rule Section 2(a).

Alpari, as I mentioned, was a registered NFA member at the time the acts or transactions that are the subject of the dispute occurred and is thus a "member" for purposes of this dispute as defined by the NFA rules Section 1(j).

Defendants BNP Paribas, S.A., Credit Suisse Securities

(USA) LLC, and RBS securities, Inc. are registered NFA members.

The remaining defendants are corporate parents of the

NFA-member defendants as to whom the complaints allege no

specific suit-related conduct distinct from that of their NFA

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member subsidiaries. These actions are plainly "disputes between and among members" and thus "shall be arbitrated" under the NFA rules.

Alpari argues that only disputes "solely" between NFA members are subject to mandatory arbitration under the rules. In support, Alpari cites an NFA notice, I-99-11 from 1999, explaining the contemporaneous rule changes that initiated fully mandatory arbitration between NFA members. The notice states that "disputes solely between members will be subject to fully mandatory arbitration, which means members will be required to file their claims at NFA."

Alpari's interpretation is unpersuasive. First, the NFA notice is not part of the rules and does not bind the parties. No language in the NFA rules themselves states or implies that disputes must be solely between NFA members to be subject to mandatory arbitration.

On the contrary, such a requirement would effectively nullify the mandatory arbitration clause because claimants would be able to side-step arbitration by naming nonmember defendants in a lawsuit like the corporate parents named in these cases at bar.

Second, to the extent the notice informs the Court's interpretation of the NFA rules, in context, the notice appears to draw a distinction between disputes among members and disputes involving "associated persons."

Following the above-quoted language, the notice states: "Fully mandatory arbitration will not, however, apply to claims by or against associated persons where the claimant will still be able to choose the forum." "Associate" is a defined term in the NFA rules that pertains to "associated persons as used in the Commodity Exchange Act. See NFA rules Section 1(C); 7 U.S.C. 6K.

The CEA's implementing regulations in turn define an "associated person" as "any natural person who is associated" with certain entities, for instance, futures commission merchants in a capacity involving soliciting or accepting customers' orders or supervising such a person, 17 C.F.R. Section 1.3.

In other words, an associated person is a salesperson or supervisor of a salesperson of certain types of NFA member entities. The notice makes clear that unlike disputes between members, disputes by or against associated persons are not fully mandatory. The NFA's member arbitration web page supports this interpretation.

So assuming arguendo that the NFA rules do not require arbitration, "under principles of estoppel, a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement may compel a signatory to that agreement to arbitrate a dispute where the issues the non-signatory are seeking to resolve in arbitration are intertwined with the agreement estopped party has signed."

Ragone v. Atl. Video at Manhattan Ctr., 595 F.3d 115, 126-27, (2d Cir. 2010).

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In addition to the intertwined factual issues, there must be "a relationship among the parties of a nature that justifies a conclusion that the party which agreed to arbitrate with another entity should be estopped from denying an obligation to arbitrate a similar dispute with the adversary which is not a party at that time arbitration agreement." Id. at 127.

In this case, the factual issues are not merely intertwined. They are identical. See id. at 128 and *In re A2P SMS Antitr. Litig.*, 972 F.Supp.2d 465, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

The complaints do not distinguish between the NFA member defendants and their nonmember corporate parents, instead defining NFA members and their parent companies collectively and alleging that these collective entities "engaged in FX transactions with plaintiff and the class that are the subject matter of this lawsuit."

The ultimate parent companies, Credit Suisse Group AG and RBS Group plc, are bank holding companies, neither of which is engaged in foreign exchange trading.

Under the NFA rules, Alpari is obligated to arbitrate its disputes with the member defendants. It is estopped from denying an obligation to arbitrate the same disputes by adding nonmember holding company parents as defendants.

Finally, these matters are stayed to allow the arbitration to proceed and conclude pursuant to the FAA, 9 U.S.C., Section 3, and pursuant to Second Circuit case law, see Katz v. Cellco P'ship, 794 F.3d 341, 345, (2d Cir. 2015). So, for all of these reasons, defendants' motion to compel arbitration is granted, and the cases are stayed. Thanks very much, counsel. (Adjourned)